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A REVIEW OF BEHAVIOURAL RESEARCH  
ON DATA SECURITY 
Martin Maguire, Nathan Stuttard, Andrew Morris, Eleanor Harvey 
Abstract 
Protection of confidential information or data from being leaked to the public is a grow-
ing concern among organisations and individuals. This paper presents the results of the 
search for literature on behavioural and security aspects of data protection. The topics 
covered by this review include a summary of the changes brought about by the EU 
GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation). It covers human and behavioural aspects of 
data protection, security and data breach or loss (threats), IT architectures to protect data 
(prevention), managing data breaches (mitigation), risk assessment and data protection 
audits. A distinction is made between threats and prevention from within an organisation 
and from the outside. 
Summary: 1. Introduction. – 2. Human Aspects of Data Protection. – 2.1. Awareness and 
understanding of potential data loss. – 2.2. Human error. – 2.3. Theory of Planned Be-
haviour. – 2.4. Protection motivation theory. – 2.5. Self-efficacy. – 2.6. Deterrence theo-
ry and Sanctions. – 2.7. Trust and Acceptance: How people feel about their personal data 
and its uses. – 2.8. Security Behaviours: How people treat their personal data and the 
problems that could arise. – 2.9. Personality theory. – 3. Security and data loss (threats). 
– 3.1. Within an organisation. – 3.2.Outside an organisation. – 4. IT architectures to pro-
tect data (prevention). – 4.1. Within an organisation – Prevention. – 4.2. Outsiders – pre-
vention. – 5. Managing data breaches (mitigation). – 6. Risk assessment and data protec-
tion audit.  
1. Introduction 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) harmonizes data protection 
laws in the EU that are fit for purpose in the digital age. By introducing a single 
law, the EU believes that it will bring better transparency to help support the 
rights of individuals and grow the digital economy. 
The GDPR imposes new rules on companies, government agencies, non-
profits, and other organizations that offer goods and services to people in the 
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EU, or that collect and analyse data tied to EU residents. Even organizations 
outside Europe need to be compliant, or otherwise face significant penalties. 
The primary objective of the GDPR is to give citizens back control of their 
personal data. From an economic standpoint, the GDPR aims to simplify the 
regulatory environment for international business by unifying the regulation 
within the EU. 
The GDPR reinforces the need for organisations to collect, manage and pro-
tect their data in responsible and secure manner. There are many aspects of this 
activity that directly relates to human behaviour, whether it is employees being 
aware of data security policy and putting it into practice and adopting proce-
dures that protect the organisation from data loss through carelessness or from 
data breaches due to planned and targeted behaviour. 
This paper reviews literature on the behavioural aspects of data security 
within an organisation and by its employees. It can form a basis for thinking 
about data security and developing procedures for keeping data secure. 
2. Human Aspects of Data Protection 
It has been shown that very often, people are the weak link in a data protec-
tion system. Not only are they prone to error and poor decisions, but their be-
havioural patterns can be tracked making them targets for attacks. They are un-
predictable and unique which makes design solutions challenging. They vary 
widely in their knowledge and perceptions of security. Their behaviours contra-
dict their attitudes. They are ill-informed of the dangers. They are apathetic be-
cause of the pace of change. They are deceived by services they trust. They are 
easily persuaded to share data for small gains like popularity. The privacy para-
dox, behavioural targeting, and motivations for sharing information are key top-
ics.  
2.1. Awareness and understanding of potential data loss 
Information security awareness 
In general, awareness of information security policies within organisations is 
questionable. For example, one study found that only 15% of their sample of 
university employees were aware of the contents of their information security 
policy, while only 25% of employees practiced appropriate information security 
behaviours during work (Moquin and Wakefield, 2016). Indeed, more recent 
evidence revealed that 40% of employees, when questioned about their compa-
 Section I: Articles 
European Journal of Privacy Law & Technologies 1 | 2018 
18 
ny’s security policy, stated that they knew nothing about the policy and recom-
mended that information security awareness training be implemented.  
Information security awareness training has been used to boost employee’s 
engagement with information security policies. For example, Alkalbani et al 
(2015) found that awareness training significantly influenced compliance to-
wards adopting information security compliance in organisations. It has also 
been demonstrated that when employees are made aware of a company’s infor-
mation security policy, they tend to be more competent with regards to carrying 
out cybersecurity behaviours, compared to employees who have not been made 
aware.  
Aspects of previously described theory are also relevant with regards to rais-
ing awareness of information security policies. For example, as this lecture has 
already explored, threat appraisal is important with regards to compliance with 
information security practices. However, in the same vein, awareness of securi-
ty threats drives this formation of beliefs. Therefore, both protection motivation 
and awareness are important for compliance with information security policies. 
Information security awareness training can also alter specific computer re-
lated behaviours. Creating longer and stronger passwords is one outcome of in-
formation security awareness training. Other approaches include using phishing 
education programs. Phishing refers to an attempt to gain electronic access to 
sensitive information such as passwords by masquerading as a seemingly trust-
worthy entity, and usually occurs in the form of a malicious link within an email. 
If such a link is clicked on, it may allow logon details/ passwords to be extract-
ed. Phishing education programs aim to spread awareness of this threat and pro-
vide subsequent training in how to deal with such problems. In one study, the 
number of times a phishing link was clicked on decreased as the study went on, 
suggesting that users’ were learning about the potential threat (Jansson and 
Solms, 2013). 
Social networks 
The privacy risks of social networks have grown exponentially since incep-
tion. Even an account which does not list any information still reveals a social 
graph which can be analysed to infer personal information (Akcora et al., 2012).  
Risks ina number of areas of social media have been researched including: 
bullying (Akcora et al., 2012), crime (fraud and burglary), stalking, regret 
(Ghiglieri et al., 2014) helicopter parenting, micromanagement of staff (Cheung, 
2014), vulnerable to malware and even cyber-warfare (Crossler and Bélanger, 
2014), threats to organisations if employees post work-related information of 
social media (Molok et al., 2010) 
Health terms (i.e., Pregnancy, Depression, Breast Cancer), Job terms (i.e., 
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Analyst, Senior Analyst in New York), Travel terms (i.e., traveling from Napoli 
Capodichino to New York (JFK) and travel dates) have also been considered as 
sensitive information (Malandrino et al., 2013) 
In the default settings, friending on Facebook affords that ‘friend’ full access 
to the user’s profile, and ‘friends of friends’ almost as much – on average this 
amounts to 16,900 strangers. Would users comfortably share this much personal 
information with this many friends and strangers offline? Furthermore, the risk 
increases when considering the substantial number of connections through so-
cial media who have only met virtually, not physically. (Akcora et al., 2012). 
Facebook is good at mitigating threats from outsiders but poor within a user’s 
existing friend network (Spiliotopoulos and Oakley, 2013) 
Unfortunately, studies have shown that users are not used to specifying pri-
vacy settings and very rarely change the permissive default settings (Akcora et 
al., 2012) – they do not know who can access their content or how to change 
this (Bergström, 2015; Ghiglieri et al., 2014). Matters are made worse by pro-
viders who constantly change privacy settings to make personal data more visi-
ble (Ghiglieri et al., 2014) like Facebook Places which arguably never obtained 
valid consent to share these data and does not provide a way to disable it 
(Cheung, 2014).  
‘Even after numerous press reports and widespread disclosure of leakages on 
the Web and on popular Online Social Networks, many users appear not be ful-
ly aware of the fact that their information may be collected, aggregated and 
linked with ambient information for a variety of purposes’. Free OSN services 
are paid for by advertising, which in turn is paid for by users with increasing 
amounts of their personal data, allowing firms to target their campaign (Malan-
drino et al., 2013). Most of the economic value in data is in purposes other than 
that which it was collected for (Bartolomeo et al., 2013). 
People may be aware of the privacy of content of messages or posts they 
send, but usually forget the metadata attached to these which could allow a 
third-party to track their location and social connections (Bartolomeo et al., 
2013)  
Many users are unaware that photos taken on their smart phones are geo-
tagged with a location which is then made available to third-parties when they 
upload these images to social media, making them vulnerable to attacks 
(Cheung, 2014) 
“According to a 2012 nationwide survey of 2254 adults by the Pew Research 
Centre in the US, 54% of app users decided not to install cell phone app after 
they discovered how much personal data they would need to share to use it” 
(Boyles et al., 2012). 
Advertising companies claim to aggregate data, so individuals are not identi-
fiable, but this was not found to be the case (Cheung, 2014). The GDPR recog-
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nises the need for anonymisation and also provides guidance on pseudonymisa-
tion where personally identifiable information fields within a data record are re-
placed by one or more artificial identifiers, or pseudonyms. 
Prevention 
Tools on social networking sites are emerging which support users’ more 
privacy-awareness (such as controlling access based on relationships or setting 
privacy preferences). However, (Akcora et al., 2012) argue these tools do not do 
enough to raise awareness of the potential risks that should form the basis of us-
er decisions about disclosure.  
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) is well-established in enterprise environments to 
prevent leaks due to human error, but in a personal context DLP is an emerging 
field. While enterprise DLP scans content, warning of and blocking unauthorised 
communication, in personal DLP the final choice lies with the user making it 
more important to make them aware of the risks (Ghiglieri et al., 2014). 
Hull (2015) argues putting self-management in such a prominent position in 
privacy law allows privacy as a commodity that can be bought and sold and ac-
tually facilitates its abuse and erosion.  
Attitude to risk varies between individuals so tools have been developed 
based on users behaviours. (Akcora et al., 2012) developed an algorithm which 
learns users’ attitude to risk based on their responses to questions about sample 
profiles and sets their privacy preferences accordingly. (Ghiglieri et al., 2014) 
developed a tool which supports self-assessment of Facebook posts based on 
learning from users’ previous activity. 
Bartolomeo et al. (2013) calls for flexible, timely and efficient ways for us-
ers to change their privacy preferences and stresses the link between social and 
technical aspects of data protection - the emphasis should be on how the data is 
used, not the data itself. In line with GDPR, he proposes a system of user-
friendly ‘licences’ which allow users to subscribe to a ‘privacy package’ and re-
evaluate it when it expires – simplifying the processes and giving users more 
options than a binary tick box.  
(Terada et al., 2016) analysed PC logs to identify behaviours and psycholog-
ical characteristics of people most likely to experience a cyber-attack: For in-
stance people who spent the shortest amount of time reading the terms and con-
ditions have a strong benefit perception (bias) whereas those who avoid key 
presses when the PC freezes are risk averse. These data could be used to predict 
risk, target interventions, and select employees.  
Challenges 
Protection Motivation Theory is a model describing the psychology that mo-
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tivates people to protect their data (Floyd, et al. 2000 cited in (Crossler and Bé-
langer, 2014). Similar to risk homeostasis (Wilde, 1982) when people feel vul-
nerable they take actions to reduce the threat.  
One of the problems of alerting people about behaviours which could com-
promise security is how this is presented to the user without disruption or an-
noyance (Maurer et al., 2011). (Stoll et al., 2008) found many existing security 
alerts are designed for experts not users: They are text-based and threat-specific, 
and often mean the alerts are ignored, whereas a well-designed GUI would sup-
port non-experts in making better informed security decisions.  
(Leon et al., 2012) found serious usability flaws which prevent users opting 
out of behavioural advertising: Confusion between multiple tracking services, 
inappropriate default settings, communication problems, lack of feedback, re-
duced functionality, and confusing interfaces.  
Cloud computing is quickly becoming the 5th utility service – after water, 
electricity, gas, and telephony – but ‘the current state of the art is not specifical-
ly tuned to understand the behaviour of internal (employees) or external users 
(customers) of IaaS’ (Infrastructure as a Service) (Khan et al., 2012). 
Many infrastructure providers have designed fully automated cloud systems, 
with no allowances for human behaviour, meaning once they are provisioned hu-
man errors cannot be controlled. This is a significant risk and one many people 
are unaware of: Google promises 0.01% for data outages but this does not account 
for data loss due to human error (Khan et al., 2012). Human behaviour is unpre-
dictable which poses a problem when creating scenarios to test user behaviours 
with traditional host-based intrusion detection systems (Khan et al., 2012). 
2.2. Human error 
Human error can roughly be thought of as a failure to carry out a specific job 
or task, which results in the disruption of scheduled operations.  
There is little data on human error of end-users, most statistics are about 
losses from organisations. The IT policy compliance group suggests that 75% of 
all data loss is due to user error (cited in Khan et al., 2012). For incidents in-
volving economic loss, 65% are caused by human error compared to 3% exter-
nal threats. Human error cannot be controlled by technical solutions alone so 
individuals need to made sure their data is secure (Crossler and Bélanger, 2014) 
The majority of data loss is due to human error. According to a survey con-
ducted by IBM, 47% of all information leakages are due to internal fraud or ma-
licious attacks [this includes being fooled by phishing as a type of human error], 
25% are due to human error, and 29% are due to system vulnerabilities (Terada 
et al., 2016). 
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Human error has different definitions. However, one way in which error has 
been defined was by James Reason (1990). Reason provides different defini-
tions of error. 
Reason defines error in relation to intentional actions.  
– A slip occurs when an everyday, familiar task fails to go as the person in-
tended. An example of this could be operating the wrong switch while operating 
a crane. 
– Lapses cause a user to forget to carry out an action/lose track of a task, due 
to distraction or interruptions.  
– A mistake occurs due to an error from intended actions not achieving their 
desired outcome, in other words, the goal or plan was wrong. Thus, a mistake 
occurs when a user does the wrong thing, believing it to be correct. A mistake 
involves a mismatch with regards to mental processing. An example of a mis-
take could be a pilot switching off the wrong engine in a plane, believing it to 
be the correct engine to switch off. In this situation, the plan is wrong. 
Reason also describes two types of mistakes – rule-based and knowledge 
based.  
A rule-based mistake occurs when a behaviour or action occurs, based on 
previously remembered rules or procedures. As an example of a rule-based mis-
take, a vessel could be constructed, with sails designed for rules and regulations 
concerning the wind speeds of the North Sea. However, that same vessel could 
then later be deployed in the arctic sea, where the wind speeds are significantly 
different. The subsequent capsizing of this vessel could be viewed as a rule-
based mistake.  
A knowledge-based mistake is when insufficient knowledge concerning a 
task or procedure results in a solution which is inappropriate for the problem. In 
the case of the vessel described previously, the captain may not have known 
how to properly evacuate the ship, resulting in the drowning of his crew. 
Human error is an extremely important issue with regards to data and GDPR. 
At some estimates, 75% of all data loss is caused by human error. IBM esti-
mates that around 46% of all information leakages are caused by internal fraud 
or malicious attack. 
Social engineering (where someone is tricked into complying with malicious 
instructions) account for 97% of malware attacks. It is important to address the 
problem of human error, in order to mitigate the potential losses incurred by a 
data breach. This is especially important, given the increased powers for fines 
from the GDPR regulations. 
Human error can occur in a variety of different ways. For instance, Evans et 
al (2019) analysed a number of information security incidents, using a newly 
developed tool, in order to explore the causes and circumstances of information 
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security. The study found that 90% of the human errors identified were due to 
commission, or in other words, the person completed the required task, but did 
not complete it correctly.  
One of the most broadly cited reasons for human error concerns the organi-
sation itself. For instance, Linginlal et al (2009) analysed a number of inter-
views with IT privacy officers in healthcare organisations. The authors identify 
that the top three causes of data breaches relate to organisational factors – or-
ganisational limitations (workload, turnover), an inefficient business process 
(management) and poor monitoring (little or no enforcement or penalties for not 
following information security guidelines). 
Research has also shown that there may be a technological slant to data re-
lated errors. For instance, security related technostress (which refers to stress 
caused by working with computer technology on a daily basis) has been shown 
to negatively affect compliance with data security policies, as well as impacting 
the errors made by information security staff. This has implications, certainly 
for the persons approach to human error.  
Equally, aspects such as security culture and policy implementation, and 
communication have been shown to be important in explaining the cause of in-
formation security violations.  
Workload is also relevant with regards to human error in information securi-
ty. For instance, Albrechtsen et al (2007) explored the reasons for information 
security related errors, with a sample of information security personnel. This 
study found that workers who had a high information security workload experi-
enced conflict with regards to conforming to information and data security 
guidelines. These findings have been replicated across other information securi-
ty related studies (Kraemer et al., 2006; Kraemer and Carayon, 2007).  
In terms of privacy related data breaches, research has shown that a number 
of different factors are relevant with regards to causation. For instance, in cases 
where computer equipment and sensitive data has been stolen, the cause at-
tributed to this is a lack of under emphasis/ understanding of data protection 
policies (Linginal et al., 2009). Other causes identified are inappropriate skill 
with regards to using computer related equipment, as well as insufficient moni-
toring by IT management. Social engineering and employee manipulation are 
other cited causes of privacy breach incidents. 
A prominent theory concerning human error was proposed by James Reason, 
in 1990. This model breaks down the problem of human error into two main ap-
proaches – the Person Approach and the system approach. The Persons Ap-
proach focuses on the individual person within the scenario – to what extent did 
their actions, e.g. forgetfulness, inattention or moral weakness, contribute to the 
incident in question. 
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In contrast, the Systems approach concentrates on the conditions under 
which individuals work and attempts to create defences to avert errors or reduce 
their effects. The systems approach places less emphasis on the individual in 
question; instead the institution or organisation as a whole are highlighted as be-
ing a cause of the error.  
Another prominent model within the study of human error is the Swiss 
Cheese Model, also developed by Reason. This model posits that in any system, 
there are defences, barriers and safeguards put in place. In the model, each slice 
represents such a defence – for instance using physical defences such as locked 
doors or alarms, as well as human factors such as password usage and backups. 
The model describes how an incident occurs when all the holes simultaneously 
‘line up’, meaning that at each individual level of the system, there has been a 
lapse or error. The lapses at each stage of the model can be attributed to one or 
both of the following factors – active failures and latent conditions.  
Active Failures: These are unsafe acts, which are generally committed by 
people who are in direct contact with the system in question 
Latent conditions: This describes conditions which may remain inactive until 
the actual event occurs. Latent conditions may translate into workplace condi-
tions which invite error and may leave weakness within the system.  
As an example, in data management, a person may not use a password cor-
rectly (an active failure), which may be brought about by the conditions of their 
workplace, i.e. the information security policy may be poorly enforced.  
In terms of reducing human error in data and information handling, there is 
no clear cut solution, or solutions. There are a number of ways in which human 
error might be prevented or reduced. One way is through promoting the infor-
mation security policy of the company. Research has shown that employees 
who read and understand the information security policy have an enhanced and 
better understanding of it. This has implications for management, as human re-
lated errors and risk may be mitigated, if such education and awareness is pro-
moted. Another way to reduce the errors in information security is through or-
ganization-focused strategies include implementing stringent administrative 
measures, reengineering workflows, and creating better work environments 
aimed at facilitating both preventive and corrective cognitive interventions. A 
paper by Sommestad et al (2014) concisely summarises different organisational 
interventions and measures which may be useful for ensuring compliance with 
information security policies. For instance, the types of training are important, 
as are perceived benefits and involvement. The remaining focus of this lecture 
will be on compliance and motivation, in order to explore how these Human 
Factors relate to data and information security. 
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2.3. Theory of Planned Behaviour 
The theory of planned behaviour was originally developed through the work 
of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), where it was originally referred to as the Theory 
of Reasoned action. The main assumption of this theory is that a person’s rea-
soned decision to engage in a particular behaviour is predicted by their attitude, 
subjective norms and perceived behavioural controls. 
Figure 1. – Representation of the Theory of planned behaviour 
 
Within the model, intention represent a person’s motivation, that is, their 
plan to exert effort to exercise a decision. ‘Subjective norms’ refer to a person’s 
belief about how others would view their behaviour, should they engage in it. 
‘Perceived behavioural control’ refers to an individual’s perception of the 
ease or difficulty of performing a specific behaviour.  
‘Attitude’ refers to how the person views the behaviour, or in other words, 
the more favourable an attitude towards a behaviour is, the more likely they are 
to engage in that specific behaviour.  
The theory of planned behaviour also makes reference to social norms. So-
cial norms are essentially the unwritten laws which dictate how a person should 
behave. 
The theory of Planned Behaviour can explain compliance with information 
security policies in the following way: If an employee perceives that they pos-
sess sufficient capacity to carry out a security related task (perceived behaviour-
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al control), has a positive attitude towards complying with the policy (attitude) 
and also observes other people within the organisation behaving in the same 
way (perceived subjective norms), they are likely to comply with these infor-
mation security policies. 
Research has demonstrated that several of the tenets of the Theory of 
Planned behaviour are relevant for improving employee compliance towards the 
information security policy of an organisation. For example: 
The theory of planned behaviour has indicated that a number of specific in-
formation security behaviours can be enhanced. These include making stronger 
passwords and the intention to comply with information security regulations. 
Additionally, other information security specific behaviours have been shown to 
be linked to the theory of planned behaviour. For example, Glaspie and Kar-
wowski (2017) found that users who perceived others to be compliant with in-
formation security policies, as well as to be control themselves, were more like-
ly to comply with certain behaviours. For example, users did not click on links 
sent to them by strangers, updating their malware settings more often and were 
more likely to pay attention to security training.  
Furthermore, Bauer and Bernroider (2017) found that improvements in atti-
tude, personal and social norms are related to an increase in intention to comply 
with information security behaviour. Similarly, Belanger et al (2017) found that 
attitude plays a critical role in affecting the intention and eventually the enact-
ment of information security conformance behaviour, specifically the usage of 
stronger passwords. 
Foth (2016) examined the role of attitude, subjective norms and the per-
ceived behavioural controls on employee’s intention to conform with data pro-
tection regulations. The results showed that these variables are important for en-
suring compliance with data protection regulations, with subjective norms being 
especially relevant and important.  
Similarly, workgroup norms have also been shown to be important with re-
gards to users engaging in non-malicious security violations (Guo et al., 2011). 
This study found that if users perceive that they are following the similar behav-
iours to their peers, they are more likely to engage in that behaviour, whether it 
is correct or incorrect.  
The findings surrounding social norms and subjective norms are particularly 
important, as they suggest that it is the internal culture of the organisation which 
is important with regards to compliance with information security regulations. 
Thus, in any kind of intervention, the people themselves, the ‘human factor’ 
should be of paramount importance. An intervention should also target the 
group, not simply individuals, in order to ensure that all the group are familiar 
with the regulations. As GDPR brings new updates to policy, this is particularly 
important.  
 Section I: Articles 
European Journal of Privacy Law & Technologies 1 | 2018 
27
2.4. Protection motivation theory 
Protection Motivation Theory was originally created by R.W Rogers in 1975 
and was further developed in 1983. The basic idea of protection motivation the-
ory is that an individual’s motivation to protect themselves against threats is 
based on two components, with two parts in each component. These two com-
ponents are Threat appraisal and coping appraisal.  
Figure 2. – Representation of the Protection Motivation Theory 
 
 
Threat Appraisal consists of: 
[1] The perceived severity of an event. The judgement an individual will 
have about how severe a potential event will be for them.  
[2] The perceived probability of an event occurring (this is sometimes re-
ferred to as vulnerability).  
Coping Appraisal consists of: 
[1] Response Efficacy. Response efficacy refers to the ability to produce a 
desired result or the belief about the perceived benefits of an action.  
[2] Perceived Self Efficacy. The level of confidence an individual has in their 
ability to undertake a specific behaviour to prevent an event occurring.  
[3] Response Costs. The response costs are the costs associated with the car-
rying out the recommended behavior (time/monetary).  
Protection motivation refers to the result of the threat appraisal and coping 
appraisal. In other words, perceptions of threat and coping appraisals explain 
engagement in specific behaviour. In the context of information security com-
pliance, research has shown that facets of protection motivation theory are rele-
vant for explaining compliance.  
The research findings surrounding Protection Motivation Theory and infor-
mation security compliance are mixed. For example, a recent meta-analysis of 
information security behaviour with respect to protection motivation theory 
suggests that the coping appraisal variables of response efficacy and self-
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efficacy were the most important with regards to explaining information securi-
ty behaviour (Mou et a, 2017). Therefore, from a Human Factors perspective, an 
individual may be more likely to comply with information security guidelines 
based on their own volition.  
The findings of this meta-analysis are supported by other studies which have 
investigated Protection motivation theory and compliance behaviour. For in-
stance, Burns et al (2017) found that coping appraisal was much more influen-
tial in terms of the development of protection motivation, compared to threat 
appraisal. Research has also highlighted that response efficacy is particularly 
relevant for explaining compliance to information security guidelines. This sug-
gests that if an employee believes that their input to a particular system is bene-
ficial for the system as a whole, they are more likely to conform to that specific 
behaviour type.  
However, threat appraisal has also been shown to influence information se-
curity compliance. Research has demonstrated that threat appraisal is important 
with regards to password strength; this suggests that making users aware of the 
potential dangers of misusing data and information may be beneficial with re-
gards to enhancing security related behaviours.  
In another study, threat appraisal was investigated within a cloud-based 
backup scenario. The purpose of this study was to examine whether the per-
ceived threat of data loss affected the intention to regularly back up data to the 
cloud services. It was found that this perceived threat affected the user’s inten-
tion to store data securely – those who felt that they were more susceptible to a 
threat were more likely to back up their files regularly, compared to those who 
did not feel the same way. These findings been supported by other research 
studies (Sommestad et al., 2015).  
GDPR brings with it a new system of fines and powers of regulation. Thus, 
making users and employees aware of this and the potential threat which it pos-
es should be of importance to employers. 
2.5. Self-efficacy 
Self-efficacy refers to an individual’s own belief in their capabilities to suc-
cessfully engage in a specific task. In terms of information security, if a person 
has a high level of self-efficacy, they will be more confident in their own ability 
to carry out a specific information security related task, for instance, using 
stronger passwords. In the information security literature, self-efficacy is some-
times referred to as Self-Efficacy in Information Security (SEIS). 
Research has shown that employees who identify as having high levels of 
Self-efficacy also score higher on measures of information security awareness. 
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For instance, a study by Safa et al (2016) found that information security 
awareness was strongly predicted by a number of variables, including self-
efficacy, perceived behavioural control and subjective norms. Specifically, the 
results suggested that individuals with high levels of Self-efficacy believed that 
they possessed the expertise and skills to protect private data, as well as self-
belief that they could prevent information security violations. These research 
findings have been replicated elsewhere (Son, 2011; Vance, 2012). Users who 
possess high levels of Self-efficacy have also been shown to be more compliant 
with information security policies.  
Self-efficacy is also related to the adoption of specific information security 
behaviours. For example, users who possess high Self-efficacy use more securi-
ty software and features designed to protect information and data from cyber-
attacks. Users with high self-efficacy in Information security also backed up 
their data more, use stronger passwords and checked the website encryption be-
fore entering it. Other information security behaviours have also been shown to 
be positively impacted by possessing self-efficacy. For example, adherence to 
smartphone security policy in the workplace has been shown to be predicted by 
self-efficacy, as well as compliance with bring your own device policies. 
2.6. Deterrence theory and Sanctions 
General deterrence theory proposes that an individual will be disinclined to 
behave in a certain way, if they are faced with a potential punishment for their 
behaviour. General Deterrence Theory has three main principles:  
[1] Certainty. The punishment must be certain.  
[2] Celerity. The punishment given must be given swiftly. 
[3] Severity. The punishment must be severe enough to ensure that the per-
son judges that the costs of punishment outweigh the gains.  
Within the context of information security research, general deterrence theo-
ry is often referred to alongside perceived sanctions, which refers to a perceived 
punishment for a behaviour.  
General deterrence theory has been shown to be influential with regards to 
changing individual’s information security behaviour. For example, research 
has shown that when punishment for a specific information security deviant be-
haviour is both certain and severe, employees are less likely to engage in that 
specific behaviour. Thus, this suggests that if employees feel like they are more 
likely to be caught and punished for a specific behaviour, they may be less in-
clined to commit such an act. These findings are supported by research which 
has found that perceived sanctions can also influence an employees’ intention to 
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follow information security policies concerning USB usage. In addition, linked 
to the previous research findings concerning protection motivation theory, threat 
appraisal stemming from perceived legal (fines or imprisonment) and organisa-
tional (demotion, penalties) sanctions can impact on compliance attitude. In par-
ticular, this research showed that organisational sanctions are particularly rele-
vant for compliance. This suggests that the notion that a person may be pun-
ished for an action is important for shaping future compliance attitudes.  
Overall, research has generally shown that sanction effects impact the cogni-
tive attitude of users to develop either a positive or negative viewpoint with re-
gards to information security. 
Awareness of information security policies is crucial towards influencing 
compliance with such policies. This is important as GDPR provides a number of 
new stipulations with regards to how data is handled. For instance, GDPR now 
defines personal data differently – it now includes online identifiers such as IP 
addresses and mobile ID devices. GDPR also defines genetic and biometric data 
under the term “sensitive data”.  
Information security policies should aim to raise awareness of these changes, 
to ensure that compliance occurs.  
These policies should raise general and threat awareness: 
[1] In order to fulfil the requirements of ‘privacy by design’, awareness 
training should aim to incorporate the relevant aspects of the new GDPR regula-
tions. For instance, it should make it clear that personal data now included IP 
addresses, or that biometric data is now sensitive data. Raising the awareness of 
this should, according to the literature findings, help boost compliance with 
such policies.  
[2] Organisations should also make it clear to employees and users that there 
is a real threat to their data. Where this threat originates from should be illus-
trated using two perspectives. First, the potential threat from cyber-attacks such 
as phishing and social engineering should be made clear – this should be backed 
up by the appropriate statistics. Second, the stipulations of GDPR should also 
be included here. The sanctions brought in by the GDPR are much higher than 
the original Data Protection Act (1998) – the GDPR states that fines of up to 4% 
of annual turnover may be administered, or up to 20 million euros.  
In this section, it should be emphasised that fines have drastically increased. 
For instance, TalkTalks fine of £400,000 in 2016 would have cost them £59 
million under the new GDPR regulations. 
Aside from the potential threat stemming from monetary fines, the Infor-
mation Commissioner’s office has a range of powers, including the ability to 
issue warnings and reprimands, imposing temporary bans on data processing or 
suspending data transfers. Again, the literature supports the notion that sanction 
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based awareness is a key component of compliance and so this should be a key 
approach with regards to implementing the data protection reform act. 
2.7. Trust and Acceptance: How people feel about their personal data 
and its uses 
Technology, psychology, economics, management, and law all play a role in 
our view of privacy (Pelteret and Ophoff, 2016) 
Attitudes and behaviours are incongruent and sometimes contradictory 
(Bergström, 2015). Very high levels of mistrust can damage customer relation-
ships as consumers feel pressured into sharing data reluctantly and they may 
disengage from e-commerce.  
The Privacy Paradox – people care about their privacy but in practice are 
willing to give away personal information for small rewards (e.g. likes and fol-
lowers on social media). In a key paper, behavioural economics have unveiled 
the role of cognitive biases and heuristics in decision making. The type of data 
and the type of perceived threat also affect people’s privacy behaviour, but 
more research is needed to fully understand it. Kokolakis (2017) cites the prob-
lem of illiteracy and lack of awareness of the risks. The relationship is not sim-
ple – people differentiate between the type of data and the type of risk. (Tad-
dicken, 2014) 
Hull, (2015) argues people do care about their privacy but services have 
vested interests in making it difficult for them to protect themselves from inva-
sion.  
Bergström, (2015) includes data from a survey looking at age, level of edu-
cation, internet usage, trust in others and some political questions, and how con-
cerned they were about using different types of internet usage (social media, 
credit card, searching). How trusting was the only significant factor in people’s 
privacy preferences, although slight increases in concern were seen with age 
and leftward political views. Users are more bothered by the privacy of services 
that handle personal data (social media) than generic data (search results).  
Similarly (Taddicken, 2014) found “willingness to disclose information” 
[which could be synonym for trust] as the personality trait that most influenced 
people’s willingness to self-disclose. Introverts share less than extraverts.  
People are more likely to adopt online banking services if they have a good 
relationship with the offline/physical bank (Chiou and Shen, 2012). Tweens 
(young people between 10 and 12) both care about and take measures to protect 
their privacy online. Yet, these measures are sometimes haphazardly employed 
and some youth display uncertainty or ignorance about how to protect their pri-
vacy. This is a trend also seen in teens and adults. The focus of education 
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(“Stranger danger”) is too narrow, it doesn’t address their fears or equip them 
with the knowledge they need today (Davis and James, 2013). Preibusch (2013) 
provides a review of methods used to measure privacy concern.  
Among over 65s “Higher ICT use was associated with self-perceived socio-
personal characteristics such as being ‘‘satisfied with activities’’, ‘‘persever-
ing’’, ‘‘physically and emotionally independent’’ and having a ‘‘positive out-
look’’. Whereas, the majority of non-users reported that their activities did not 
change across time and that they felt ‘‘intimidated’’ and ‘‘anxious’’ with tech-
nology. The performance of ICT-based activities and/or the desire to perform 
them were significantly associated with the perceived importance of the activi-
ties. The older population’s age, education, attitudes, and personalities influence 
how they approach ICT” (Vroman et al., 2015). 
2.8. Security Behaviours: How people treat their personal data and the 
problems that could arise 
‘50% of mobile users regularly provide consent without effectively reading 
agreements, because of lack of time and excessive language complexity. And 
even if modern operating systems notify users about the permissions each new 
installed application needs, users are only provided with very limited options – 
either give consent or not use the service at all’ (Bartolomeo et al., 2013). 
“In our online experiment, we found that of our 995 participants, many re-
ported finding their social security numbers (20%), credit/debit card numbers 
(16 and 17%, respectively), bank account numbers (26%), birth dates (46%), 
email passwords (30%), and/or home addresses (76%) stored in their email ac-
counts” (Egelman et al., 2014) 
A survey found password issues are the second most likely human error to 
impact an information system. Requirements are put in place to increase 
strength but then overload human memory capabilities: Thus human factors 
need to be considered. Participants with more than 8 passwords to remember 
forgot their passwords every 2 weeks. However, these trends are complicated by 
other factors – unemployed people, for example, were found to have more 
passwords to remember than those in work were are less likely to forget them. 
Women are twice as likely to write down their passwords as men (Carstens et 
al., 2004). 
A qualitative study which interviewed people about their motivations to lock 
or not lock their phones found around a third of users do not lock their phones. 
Many believe there is no sensitive data stored on them. Only 61% of these were 
concerned about identity theft online, but less than 25% connected this with of-
fline identity theft, financial loss, or loss of sensitive information even though 
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all participants accessed email on their phone. Those who did not lock their 
phones said they did so for convenience, so that they could be reunited with a 
lost phone, or someone could make a call from their phone in an emergency 
(Egelman et al., 2014) – also offers design suggestions.  
Mobile devices also allow people to access sensitive data (their own or 
work-related) in any physical location where they could be overlooked; 
(Tarasewich et al., 2006) proposes designing ‘blinders’ to obscure sensitive 
parts of the screen but other solutions could be considered.  
Using social media for sharing work-related information (Molok et al., 2010) 
and using personal phones for business use (Goode, 2010) create new expose 
points were organisations are vulnerable to external threats. These need to be 
addressed through company policy and training.  
Location tracking embedded in mobile devises has created a state of constant 
‘uberveillance’. Location-based services (LBS) in wireless mobile devices al-
low real-time tracking which is widely used by consumers and the data now re-
veals a person’s direction of travel, trajectory, or even his or her predicted 
movements. Lawsuits have been filed against Apple and Microsoft for tracking 
users despite their request not to be and even when location software was turned 
off. Geo-location services are considered sensitive data under GDPR (Cheung, 
2014).  
2.9. Personality theory 
Personality is loosely defined as a set of characteristics which determine how 
an individual thinks, feels and behaves. 
The big five factor model was originally developed by Tupes and Christal in 
1961, though the theory built heavily on work carried out by Cattell (1943). The 
model was then validated by Costa and McCrae in 1986, who provided evi-
dence as to the validity of the measures. The findings of Costa and McCrae 
have been validated across a number of different societies and cultures, suggest-
ing that it is an accepted and valid measure of personality.  
 
The big five model of personality consists of five main traits. These are: 
[1] Extraversion. This refers to how outgoing and social a person is. The po-
lar opposite of extraversion is introversion, which refers to a shy and reserve in-
dividual. 
[2] Emotional Stability/ Neuroticism. This refers to a person’s ability to re-
main stable and balanced. Neuroticism refers to insecurity, anxiousness and 
hostility. The terms ‘emotional stability’ and ‘neuroticism’ are often used inter-
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changeably, as emotional stability is the inverse of neuroticism.  
[3] Agreeableness. This is a person’s tendency to be compassionate and co-
operative toward others and obedient to regulations. 
[4] Conscientiousness. This is a person’s tendency to act in an organized or 
thoughtful way. 
[5] Openness to experience. This is the extent to which a person is open to 
experiencing a variety of activities. 
The five-factor model has been studied extensively with regards to infor-
mation security compliance. Generally, this is because it is the most widely ac-
cepted measure of personality. In the next section of this lecture, each personali-
ty dimension of the big five will be discussed in detail with regards to what re-
search has shown in terms of data and information security. 
Conscientiousness 
This refers to a person’s tendency to act in an organized or thoughtful way. 
A person who is conscientious will feel that they have a sense of duty towards 
others and this will be reflected in their actions. 
Conscientiousness impacts on how a person handles data and information 
within an organisation. One way which this has been demonstrated is through 
examining the typical characteristics of top performing security personnel com-
pared to non-security personnel. In doing so, light has been shed on the key dif-
ferences in terms of personality between these two groups. Top performing se-
curity personnel not only score higher on the workplace values of theoretical 
(discovering the truth through systematic thinking and reasoning) and economic 
(an interest in usefulness and practicality), but also score higher on the personal-
ity trait of openness. These findings suggest that IT personnel who can perform 
a job well also tend to behave in an organised and focused way. Other research 
into personality and information security awareness has found that conscien-
tious and agreeable individuals tend to have higher information security aware-
ness, compared to other personnel.  
Not only are workplace values correlated with conscientiousness, but it has 
been shown that individuals with higher levels of conscientiousness generate 
stronger passwords and also do not reuse/recycle passwords between accounts. 
Furthermore, the relationship between intent and actual use of security pro-
grams for data and information is moderated by conscientiousness and agreea-
bleness (Shropshire, Warkentin and Sharma, 2015).  
Research has also shown that the security knowledge of management within 
information security can be influenced by personality. Specifically, conscien-
tiousness is significantly related to information security executive’s attitude to-
wards the management of information security. 2.7 Implications for GDPR 
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Extraversion 
Extraversion generally refers to how outgoing and social a person is. To be 
clear, the opposite of extraversion is introversion, which refers to being reserved 
and shy.  
Extraversion has been linked to a number of information security behaviours. 
For instance, extraversion has been correlated with the likelihood of securing a 
device which contains sensitive data (Gratien et al 2018). This suggests that 
those with outgoing personalities are more likely to secure their device. Similar-
ly, employees who create stronger passwords also tend to score higher on extra-
version measures. The same behaviour also correlated with higher scores on 
neuroticism, which is the opposite trait of emotional stability.  
As GDPR introduces legislative changes, this will require the information 
security policy of the company to be updated. Part of this process may involve 
providing feedback to employees. How well this feedback is received may de-
pend upon the personality of the individual. Research has shown that IT person-
nel who score highly on measures of extraversion are more responsive to feed-
back concerning their behaviour, compared to individuals who score highly on 
personality traits such as neuroticism. Similarly, individuals who are classed as 
extraverted have also been shown to be better at detecting phishing emails, 
which is surprising given that extraverted users may be more likely to be trust-
ing, rather than less so. 
Agreeableness and Emotional Stability 
Agreeableness refers to being compassionate and cooperative toward others 
and obedient to regulations. In the context of information security, research has 
shown that agreeableness has a positive influence on information personnel’s 
concerns for information security and that agreeable individuals have stronger 
information sensitivity. Furthermore, for these individuals, agreeableness along-
side extraversion was influential in forming data privacy concerns.  
A further personality trait is Emotional Stability. Users who are emotionally 
stable will be generally be able to remain stable and balanced, especially under 
pressure. Halevi et al (2016) examined the cyber security habits of IT profes-
sionals, in relation to cultural, personality and demographic variables. The study 
found that neuroticism (the opposite of emotional stability) was inversely corre-
lated towards self-efficacy beliefs in ability to use security software correctly. 
McCormac et al (2017) found that emotional stability significantly explained 
the variance in information security awareness.  
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Psychological capital, locus of control and impulsivity 
Psychological Capital refers to a construct which is made up of work-related 
tenets of positive psychology: Hope, optimism, resilience and Self efficacy. Re-
search has shown that psycap relates positively with the positive coping mecha-
nism of security response efficacy 
 Another personality dimension to be discussed is Locus of control. This is 
defined as an individual’s belief system regarding the causes of his or her expe-
riences and the factors to which that person attributes success or failure. Re-
search has shown that locus of control is related to information security. For in-
stance, Hadlington et al (2018) found that individuals who scored higher on the 
work locus of control scale, and thus exhibited a greater degree of externality. 
Workman et al (2008) found that coping with information security threats was 
dependent on whether people perceived that the threat was preventable in the 
first place (LOC). 
A further personality dimension is impulsivity. Impulsivity refers to a ten-
dency to act spontaneously without reflecting on an action and its consequences. 
Research has examined awareness and engagement in good cybersecurity be-
haviours, including using different passwords for device securement and found 
that impulsivity was negatively correlated with good information security be-
haviours. Therefore, this trait may help to predict if a person will engage in 
risky security behaviour. Similar findings have also been found with regards to 
detecting phishing emails. 
Clearly, personality affects how an individual behaves around data. As the 
new GDPR regulations have brought in new rules concerning both how data 
must be stored as well as new definitions of data, one consideration could be the 
screening of job candidates. The previous slides have illustrated that certain per-
sonality characteristics are associated with positive information security behav-
iours, i.e. password usage/backups. Therefore, in light of the new regulations, it 
makes sense that potential hires should be compliant with information security 
policies – and this could easily be gauged through using personality type testing. 
This could come in form of identifying potential members of staff which might 
be more at risk of dangerous data behaviours. This could be done by subtle per-
sonality screening, perhaps using a condensed big five scale. 
3. Security and data loss (threats) 
3.1. Within an organisation 
Colwill (2009) examines some of the key issues relating to insider threats to 
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information security and the nature of loyalty and betrayal in the context of or-
ganisational, cultural factors and changing economic and social factors. It is 
recognised that insiders pose security risks due to their legitimate access to fa-
cilities and information, knowledge of the organisation and the location of valu-
able assets.  
Insiders will know how to achieve the greatest impact whilst leaving little 
evidence. The paper describes a practitioner’s view of the issue and the ap-
proaches used by BT to assess and address insider threats and risks. Proactive 
measures need to be taken to mitigate against insider attacks rather than reactive 
measures after the event. A key priority is to include a focus on insiders within 
security risk assessments and compliance regimes. This requires a focus on hu-
man factors, education and awareness and greater attention on the security ‘af-
tercare’ of employees and third parties. 
Khan and Oriol (2012) state that as cloud computing is transparent to both 
the programmers and the users, it induces challenges that were not present in 
previous forms of distributed computing. Furthermore, cloud computing enables 
its users to abstract away from low-level configuration such as configuring IP 
addresses and routers. This is also true for security services, for instance auto-
mating security policies and access control in cloud, so that individuals or end-
users using the cloud only perform very high-level (business oriented) configu-
ration. 
Koops and Leenes (2014) also promote the privacy by design, employing the 
principle that principle that privacy should be promoted as a default setting of 
every new ICT system and should be built into systems from the design stage. 
The paper discusses what the proposed legal obligation for ‘privacy by design’ 
implies in practice for online businesses. In terms of the regulatory tool-box, 
privacy by design should be approached less from a ‘code’ perspective, but ra-
ther from the perspective of ‘communication’ strategies. 
Nurse et al (2014) emphasise that threat that insiders pose to businesses, in-
stitutions and governmental organisations continues to be of serious concern. 
They propose a novel conceptualisation grounded in insider threat case studies, 
existing literature and relevant psychological theory. It acts as a platform for 
general understanding of the threat, and also for reflection, modelling past at-
tacks and looking for useful patterns that can lead to addressing the threats. 
Stamati-Koromina et al (2012) investigate the different types of insider 
threats and their implications to the corporate environment, with specific em-
phasis to the special case of data leakage. They propose a design for a forensic 
readiness model, which is able to identify, prevent and log email messages, 
which attempt to leak information from an organisation with the aid of ste-
ganography. 
Urquhart and McAuley (2018) state that security incidents such as targeted 
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distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on power grids and hacking of fac-
tory industrial control systems (ICS) are on the increase. They argue the indus-
trial IoT brings four security challenges, namely: appreciating the shift from of-
fline to online infrastructure; managing temporal dimensions of security; ad-
dressing the implementation gap for best practice; and engaging with infrastruc-
tural complexity. Their goal is to surface risks and foster dialogue to avoid the 
emergence of an Internet of Insecure Industrial Things. 
Borgesius (2016) states that many behavioural targeting companies say that, 
as long as they do not tie names to data they hold about individuals, they do not 
process any personal data, and that, therefore, data protection law does not ap-
ply to them. However European Data Protection Authorities take the view that a 
company processes personal data if it uses data to single out a person, even if it 
cannot tie a name to these data. This paper argues that data protection law 
should indeed apply to behavioural targeting and so appropriate measures need 
to be taken to address this issue. 
3.2. Outside an organisation 
Alneyadi et al (2014) have carried out a survey on data leakage prevention 
systems. Traditionally, confidentiality of data has been preserved using security 
procedures such as information security policies along with conventional securi-
ty mechanisms such as firewalls, virtual private networks and intrusion detec-
tion systems. Unfortunately, these mechanisms lack pro-activeness and dedica-
tion towards protecting confidential data, and in most cases, they require prede-
fined rules by which protection actions are taken. This can result in serious con-
sequences, as confidential data can appear indifferent forms indifferent leaking 
channels. Therefore, there has been an urge to mitigate these drawbacks using 
more efficient mechanisms. Recently, data leakage preventions systems (DLPSs) 
have been introduced as dedicated mechanisms to detect and prevent the leak 
age of confidential data in use, in transit and at rest. DLPs use different tech-
niques to analyse the content and the context of confidential data to detect or 
prevent the leakage. Although DLPs are increasingly being designed and devel-
oped as standalone products by IT security vendors and researchers, the term is 
still ambiguous. In their paper, the authors have carried out a comprehensive 
survey on the current DLPs mechanisms. They explicitly define DLPs and cate-
gorise active research directions in this field. In addition, they suggest future di-
rections towards developing more consistent DLPs that can overcome some of 
the weaknesses of the current ones. 
Al-Sayid and Aldlaeen (2013) conduct a survey of database security threats. 
They highlight threat types and their impacts on sensitive data, and present dif-
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ferent security models. The assumption underlying this study is that by under-
standing the weaknesses and the threats facing databases, database administra-
tors can then begin to create a security plan to better protect their databases. 
Gupta and Sharman (2012) provide a categorization of data breaches using 
empirical investigation. The article categorizes the incident and loss trends in-
to different dimensions including the industry, victim type, data type, and 
threats such as stolen computer, hacking and unauthorized access. The re-
search can aid individuals and organizations understand the data breach, 
trends and evaluate their own risks in handling personal information, which 
will help them to make better and informed decisions to protect against data 
breaches. 
Lechler et al (2011) identify and evaluate the threat of transitive information 
leakage in healthcare systems. Using a case study of a major hospital in the 
NY/NJ metropolitan area they demonstrate the complexity of the healthcare sys-
tem and its inherent information security risks. The study shows that only a sys-
temic perspective allows identifying all potential risks and providing solutions 
for improved information security. The main conclusion of this study is that 
transitive information risks have major implications for healthcare organizations 
and regulators. Identifying these risks will significantly improve information 
security in the healthcare environment. 
Sabillon et al (2016) acknowledge that cybercrime is growing rapidly around 
the world, as new technologies, applications and networks emerge. In addition, 
the Deep Web has contributed to the growth of illegal activities in cyberspace. 
As a result, cybercriminals are taking advantage of system vulnerabilities for 
their own benefit. Their article presents the history and conceptualization of cy-
bercrime, explores different categorizations of cybercriminals and cyberattacks, 
and sets forth a cyberattack typology, or taxonomy. Common categories include 
where the computer is the target to commit the crime, where the computer is 
used as a tool to perpetrate the felony, or where a digital device is an incidental 
condition to the execution of a crime. They conclude their study by analysing 
lessons learned and future actions that can be undertaken to tackle cybercrime 
and harden cybersecurity at all levels. 
4. IT architectures to protect data (prevention) 
4.1. Within an organisation - Prevention 
Software assurance methodologies aim to assist developers in improving the 
security of software production. The Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) is 
one such example developed by Al-Fedaghi and Alkandari (2011). Their meth-
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od uses a flow-based methodology and focuses on the system requirements re-
lating to threats, risks 
Work by Bolognini and Bistolfi (2017) discusses the move towards the col-
lection of personal data as part of “Big Data analysis”. They state that the op-
portunities arising from the analysis of such information need to be balanced 
with the risks for the data protection of individuals. While anonymization is a 
traditional technique for protecting personal data, they argue that pseudony-
misation can be used both to reduce the risks of re-identification and help data 
controllers and processors to maintain their personal data protection obligations 
by keeping control over their activities. 
Cavoukian’s (2011) 7 principles for ‘Privacy by Design’ developed in the 
1990’s advances the view that the future of privacy cannot be assured solely by 
compliance with regulatory frameworks; rather, privacy assurance must ideally 
become an organization’s default mode of operation. Ensuring privacy and 
gaining personal control over one’s information and, for organisations, gaining 
a sustainable competitive advantage can be achieved by following the 7 princi-
ples that she describes. 
Chow et al. (2009) considers the problem of how sensitive content is revised 
in order for it to be distributed. In order to do this redaction, is often used, the 
“blacking out” of sensitive words and phrases. Redaction has the side effect of 
reducing the utility of the content, often so much that the content is no longer use-
ful. Consequently, government agencies and others are increasingly exploring the 
revision of sensitive content as an alternative to redaction that preserves more 
content utility. This approach is called sanitisation or pseudonymisation. Chow et 
al’s have developed a Web tool to automatically identify sensitive words and 
phrases to help quickly evaluate revision for sensitivity. The authors warn against 
“slippery slope” where the usefulness and apparent authoritativeness of the tool 
may lead users to neglect their own judgment in favour of the tool’s. 
Colesky et al’s (2016) paper looks at design strategies to achieve ‘Privacy by 
Design’ to meet the requirements of the GDPR. Their paper improves the strat-
egy definitions and suggests an additional level of abstraction between strate-
gies and privacy patterns called ‘tactics’. They identify a collection of such tac-
tics based on an extensive literature review, in particular a catalogue of sur-
veyed privacy patterns. They explore the relationships between the concepts 
that they introduce, and similar concepts used in software engineering. This pa-
per aims to helps bridge the gap between data protection requirements set out in 
law and help system development practice. 
Heurix et al (2015) consider privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) belong 
to a class of technical measures which aim at preserving the privacy of individ-
uals or groups of individuals. They describe a universal taxonomy of PETs and 
a tool for the systematic comparison of them. To demonstrate its applicability, 
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the author’s proposed taxonomy is applied to a set of key technologies covering 
different disciplines such as data anonymization, privacy-preserving data query-
ing, communication protection, and identity hiding. 
Hildebrand (2014) discusses the new smart environments that anticipate our 
future behaviours and adapt their own behaviours to accommodate our inferred 
preferences. They provide us with a ubiquitous artificial intelligence that up-
roots the common sense of our Enlightenment heritage that matter is passive 
and mind active. She argues the new regulation could be a game changer. It es-
tablishes a new incentive structure and is based on a salient understanding of 
law’s need for effective [not theoretical] technology neutrality. 
Distributed usage control is concerned with how data may or may not be 
used in distributed system environments after initial access has been granted. If 
data flows through a distributed system, there exist multiple copies of the data 
on different client machines. Usage constraints then have to be enforced for all 
these clients. Kelbert and Pretschner (2013) develop a distributed usage control 
enforcement infrastructure that generically and application-independently ex-
tends the scope of usage control enforcement to any system receiving usage-
controlled data. 
Khan et al. (2012) discuss the security risks and their management in 
cloud computing. Cloud computing provides outsourcing of resources bring-
ing economic benefits. The outsourcing however does not allow data owners 
to outsource the responsibility of confidentiality, integrity and access control, 
as it still is the responsibility of the data owner. The paper presents a risk in-
ventory which documents the security threats identified in terms of availabil-
ity, integrity and confidentiality for cloud infrastructures in detail for future 
security risks. They also propose a methodology for performing security risk 
assessment for cloud computing architectures presenting some of the initial 
results. 
From an information privacy perspective, King and Raja (2012) analyse how 
well the regulatory frameworks in place in Europe and the United States help 
protect the privacy and security of sensitive consumer data in the cloud. It 
makes suggestions for regulatory reform to protect sensitive information in 
cloud computing environments and to remove regulatory constraints that limit 
the growth of this vibrant new industry. 
Two exploratory studies were conducted by Kraemer and Carayon (2005) to 
identify the various dimensions of CIS (Computer and Information Security) 
culture. One study included an industry workgroup consisting of six CIS man-
agers and specialists. The second study consisted of individual interviews with 
eight CIS managers and managers and eight network administrators. The 
workgroup and CIS managers and network administrators provided a prelimi-
nary list of elements in CIS culture dimensions, including: employee participa-
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tion, training, hiring practices, reward system, management commitment, and 
communication and feedback. 
Personas represent a powerful tool for designing systems to meet user needs. 
In a paper by Lewis and Coles Kemp (2014) comic strips are used as an ap-
proach to align personas and narrative scenarios; the resulting visual artefact 
was tested with information security practitioners, who often struggle with wid-
er engagement. It offers ways in which different professional roles can work to-
gether to share understanding of complex topics such as information security. It 
also offers user-centred design practitioners a way to reflect on, and participate 
with, user research data. 
Luger et al (2015) recognises the heightened role of designers in the regula-
tion of ambient interactive technologies. They developed and tested a series of 
data protection ideation cards with teams of designers to help make emerging 
European data protection regulations more accessible to the design community. 
Lukosch et al (2015) report on different scenarios from the security domain 
in which augmented reality (AR) techniques are used to support information ex-
change. A combination of quantitative and qualitative evaluation showed that 
AR can improve the distributed situational awareness of a team. 
McCauley-Bell and Crumpton (1998) consider the human factors issues in 
information security. They provide an overview of possible risks that users can 
pose to information systems and of the information security issues impacted by 
human interaction that may or may not play a role in promoting system security. 
Othmane and Leszek (2009) offer a solution to protecting data privacy called 
Active Bundles. The technique protects sensitive data from their disclosure to 
unauthorised parties and from unauthorised dissemination (even if started by an 
authorized party). The protocol uses buddies to provide anonymity to senders 
and receivers. Evaluation of the solution indicates that: (i) the percentage of 
sensitive data that reaches unauthorized hosts during dissemination can be high, 
(ii) the apoptosis mechanism protects sensitive data from dissemination to unau-
thorized hosts and (iii) the Active Bundles solution provides a level of anonymi-
ty to hosts while it does not decrease significantly the throughput of buddies. 
Romanou (2018) examines the extent to which Privacy by Design can safe-
guard privacy and personal data within a rapidly evolving society. This paper 
explains the theoretical concept and the general principles of Privacy by Design, 
as laid down in the General Data Protection Regulation. Then, by indicating 
specific examples of the implementation of the Privacy by Design approach, it 
demonstrates why the implementation of Privacy by Design is a necessity in a 
number of sectors where specific data protection concerns arise (biometrics, e-
health and video-surveillance) and how it can be implemented. 
Tahboub and Saleh (2014) state that traditional security approaches such as 
firewalls can’t protect data from leakage. Data leakage/loss prevention ( ) sys-
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tems are solutions that protect sensitive data from being in non-trusted hands. 
Their paper surveys DLP systems and compares them with other security and 
data protection approaches. 
Inadvertent data disclosure by insiders is considered as one of the biggest 
threats for corporate information security Wűchner and Pretschner (2012). Data 
loss prevention systems typically try to cope with that problem by monitoring 
access to confidential data and preventing their leakage or improper handling. 
However, they are limited when enforcing more complex security policies that 
for instance specify temporal or cardinal constraints on the execution of events. 
Their paper presents UC4Win, a data loss prevention solution based on the con-
cept of data-driven usage control to allow such a fine-grained policy-based pro-
tection. UC4Win is capable of detecting and controlling data-loss related events 
at the level of individual function calls and can track the flows of confidential 
data through the system. 
Halboob et al (2015) examined computer forensics and privacy protection 
fields and observed that there are two conflicting directions in computer data 
security. In the other words, computer forensics tools try to discover and extract 
digital evidences related to a specific crime, while privacy protection techniques 
aim at protecting the data owner’s privacy. As a result, finding a balance be-
tween these two fields is a serious challenge. Existing privacy-preserving com-
puter forensics solutions consider all data owner’s data as private and, as a re-
sult, they collect and encrypt the entire data. However, this increases the inves-
tigation cost in terms of time and resources. Therefore, there is a need for hav-
ing privacy levels for computer forensics so that only relevant data are collected 
data and then only private relevant data are encrypted. Halboob et al propose 
privacy levels for computer forensics starting with classifying forensic data, and 
then analysing all data access possibilities within computer forensics. They also 
define several privacy levels based on access possibilities which lead to more 
efficient privacy-preserving computer forensics solutions. They conclude that 
development of a privacy-preserving computer forensics framework based on 
these privacy levels is required and that further work is required for defining 
levels and policies for network forensics and supporting fully automatic data se-
lection for selecting the private and/or relevant data. 
Version control is also a technique that can be used to avert risks. Version 
control is the process by which different drafts and versions of a document or 
record are managed. It is a “tool” which tracks a series of draft documents, cul-
minating in a final version and it provides an audit trail for the revision and up-
date of these finalised versions. Version control is important for data documents 
that undergo a lot of revision and redrafting and is particularly important for 
electronic documents because they can easily be changed by several different 
users. These changes may not be immediately apparent. Knowing which version 
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of a document is being examined is important, for example, in order to find out 
which version of a policy is currently in force, or which version of a policy was in 
use at a time. There are several software tools that can be used to manage version 
control safely and effectively. One of the main issues regarding version control is 
the requirements to destroy previous versions of documents once the final version 
has been approved (although retaining previous versions is sometimes useful in 
documenting the thinking that led to the final version.) In some cases, Data Pro-
tection and Freedom of Information Acts determine that the information held, in-
cluding drafts of previous versions may be subject to disclosure. 
Li et al (2017) argue that having multiple copies of data has high reliability 
but also has the disadvantage of high redundancy storage and low space utiliza-
tion. They demonstrate a data backup method based on XOR checksum being 
suitable for storing hot temporary data, which first splits the data into two parts 
and then performs the XOR operation of the two parts to generate another part 
of the data. Finally, the XOR checksum stores the three data parts into different 
nodes. The checksum not only ensures the security of data but also saves the 
storage space, thus improving the performance of reading and writing. This 
strategy achieves a mutual backup between the three nodes in order to ensure 
data security. Because there is only one copy of original data in the system, this 
model resolves the data inconsistency problem reasonably and simplifies the da-
ta version control existing in the redundancy backup model. 
Mao et al (2104) state that cloud storage is an ideal way of data storage and 
has been widely used. However, it must be ensured that data is not lost or dam-
aged. Most cloud storage systems use replica redundancy technique to solve the 
problem of the loss of data. Commonly used strategies include: consistency 
strategy based on replica chain, consistency strategy based on multi-version 
control, and consistency strategy based on timestamp. They discuss their re-
search into consistency strategies as a focus for cloud storage data security. 
Conway et al (2107) also consider the data security aspects of cloud compu-
ting. They state that there is still a lot to learn about the adoption and use of 
cloud, including issues such as security, data protection, interoperability, service 
maturity, and return on investment. They describe an assessment model devel-
oped by the Innovation Value Institute (IVI) using a multi method, two-phased 
approach. The first phase involved a review of the current academic and practi-
tioner literature in the area of cloud. The second phase employed the principles 
of design science and open innovation to pilot, test, validate, and refine the 
cloud adoption assessment in collaboration with industry-based practitioners. 
By using the assessment model, the level of maturity will identify areas of 
strength and weakness within the organization and serve as the basis for an im-
provement roadmap, to ensure the successful adoption and on-going manage-
ment of cloud. 
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Scharnick et al (2016) discuss that investing in data security that is intangi-
ble is often not seen as priority expenditure as it brings no Return on Investment 
nor contributes to expanding the business. However, the newly enacted Protec-
tion of Personal Information (POPI) Act in South Africa, requires businesses to 
re-evaluate their stance on information security and data storage protection as 
POPI requires that ‘appropriate and reasonable security measures’ be put in 
place to effectively protect all personal information that large organisations as 
well as smaller businesses process and more importantly store. However, the 
lack of comprehensive controls found within any one information security ap-
proach (information security standard, best practice or framework) to fully ad-
dress the requirements of the POPI act, leaves businesses exposed to legislative 
action under POPI. Their paper analyses widely implemented information secu-
rity approaches in the context of POPI compliance. An evaluation of the com-
prehensiveness of these approaches and their proposed mechanisms for protect-
ing data within businesses is conducted. 
4.2. Outsiders – prevention 
Al-Fedaghi (2011) presents a theoretical framework for DLP in terms of a 
flow-based conceptual model. It proposes that DLP can be oriented toward the 
entire information lifecycle and incorporate diverse processes in the course of 
business by using this framework as a foundation for specification and design of 
DLP. To demonstrate feasibility of the approach, the model is applied to the Rec-
ords and Information Management system of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. 
According to Blasco et al (2012) insider threats are an increasing concern for 
most modern organizations. Data Leakage Protection (DLP) systems have been 
developed to tackle this issue and work by tracking sensitive information flows 
and monitoring executed applications to ensure that sensitive information is not 
leaving the organisation. However, current DLP systems do not fully consider 
that trusted applications represent a threat to sensitive information confidentiali-
ty. In their paper, they demonstrate how to use common trusted applications to 
evade current DLP systems. They analyse the proposed evasion technique from 
the malicious insider point of view and discuss some possible countermeasures 
to mitigate its use to steal information. 
Borders and Prakash (2009) present an approach for quantifying information 
leak capacity in network traffic. Instead of trying to detect the presence of sensi-
tive data—an impossible task in the general case—their goal is to measure and 
constrain its maximum volume. They take advantage of the insight that most 
network traffic is repeated or determined by external information, such as pro-
tocol specifications or messages sent by a server. By filtering this data, we can 
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isolate and quantify true information flowing from a computer. When applied to 
real web browsing traffic, the algorithms were able to discount 98.5% of meas-
ured bytes and effectively isolate information leaks. 
Costante et al (2016) state that to confront the problem of data loss (i.e. the 
unauthorized/unwanted disclosure of data, Data Loss Protection (DLP) solu-
tions either employ patterns of known attacks (signature-based) or try to find 
deviations from normal behaviour (anomaly-based). While signature-based so-
lutions provide accurate identification of known attacks and can prevention 
them, they cannot cope with unknown attacks, nor with attackers who follow 
unusual paths (like those known only to insiders) to carry out their attack. They 
offer a DLP protection framework uses an anomaly-based engine that automati-
cally learns a model of normal user behaviour, allowing it to flag when insiders 
carry out anomalous transactions. 
Gessiou et al (2011) state that the traditional approach for detecting infor-
mation leaks is to generate fingerprints of sensitive data, by partitioning and 
hashing it, and then comparing these fingerprints against outgoing documents. 
Unfortunately, this approach incurs a high computation cost as every part of 
document needs to be checked. As a result, it is not applicable to systems with a 
large number of documents that need to be protected. Additionally, the ap-
proach is prone to false positives if the fingerprints are common phrases. They 
propose an improvement for this approach to offer a much faster processing 
time with less false positives. The core idea of their solution is to eliminate 
common phrases and non-sensitive phrases from the fingerprinting process. 
Jung et al (2008) describe the design and implementation of Privacy Oracle, 
a system that reports on application leaks of user information via the network 
traffic that they send. Privacy Oracle treats each application as a black box, 
without access to either its internal structure or communication protocols. This 
means that it can be used over a broad range of applications and information 
leaks (i.e., not only Web traffic content or credit card numbers). To accomplish 
this, they develop a differential testing technique in which perturbations in the 
application inputs are mapped to perturbations in the application outputs to dis-
cover likely leaks; they leverage alignment algorithms from computational biol-
ogy to find high quality mappings between different byte-sequences efficiently. 
Kim and Kim (2010) address company monitoring of their employee’s be-
haviour using a DLP (Data Loss Prevention) solution to protect their infor-
mation assets from internal attackers. During the monitoring process, it is inevi-
table that private information is disclosed to recognize the violation of internal 
regulations for handling the company’s critical information. In their paper, the 
authors suggest a data loss prevention method considering the privacy violation 
level. They consider a method of quantifying the degree of privacy violation 
based on the data units which are exposed when the employee’s data handling is 
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monitored. At the same time, they suggest a method of quantifying the degree 
of importance of data units which are monitored. 
Lui and Khun (2010) provide an introductory paper on data loss prevention. 
It covers the data loss problem, the need to address the problem (driven by gov-
ernment and industry requirements), the data loss prevention approach covering 
loss modes, solution capabilities and best practices. 
Oetzel and Spiekermann (2014) propose a methodology to systematically 
consider privacy issues by using a step-by-step privacy impact assessment 
(PIA). Existing PIA approaches cannot be applied easily because they are im-
properly structured or imprecise and lengthy. They argue that companies that 
employ their PIA method can achieve ‘privacy-by-design’, which is widely her-
alded by data protection authorities. The contribution of the artefacts they creat-
ed is twofold: First, they provide a formal problem representation structure for 
the analysis of privacy requirements. Second, we reduce the complexity of the 
privacy regulation landscape for practitioners who need to make privacy man-
agement decisions for their IT applications. 
5. Managing data breaches (mitigation) 
Detection of data breaches is a critical area. (Shu et al., 2016) utilise se-
quence alignment techniques for detecting complex data-leak patterns. Their 
algorithm is designed for detecting long and inexact sensitive data patterns. 
This detection is paired with a comparable sampling algorithm, which allows 
one to compare the similarity of two separately sampled sequences. The sys-
tem achieves good detection accuracy in recognizing transformed leaks. In 
implementing the system, the authors demonstrate the high multithreading 
scalability of their data leak detection method required by a large organiza-
tion. 
Solutions exist for detecting inadvertent sensitive data leaks caused by hu-
man errors and to provide alerts for organizations. A common approach is to 
screen content in storage and transmission for exposed sensitive information. 
Such an approach usually requires the detection operation to be conducted in 
secrecy. However, this requirement is challenging to satisfy in practice, as de-
tection servers may be compromised or outsourced. Shu et al (2015) have de-
vised a privacy-preserving data-leak detection (DLD) solution to solve the issue 
where a special set of sensitive data digests is used in detection. The advantage 
of their method is that it enables the data owner to safely delegate the detection 
operation to a semi-honest provider without revealing the sensitive data to the 
provider. They describe how Internet service providers can offer their customers 
DLD as an add-on service with strong privacy guarantees. Evaluation has 
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shown that the method can support accurate detection with very small number 
of false alarms under various data-leak scenarios. 
Data backup operation is an essential part of common IT system administration. 
Since the backup and restore operations accrue downtime overhead or performance 
degradation, they have to be designed to ensure the data reliability while minimis-
ing the performance and availability overhead. This is especially important if data 
needs to be recovered if it is compromised by a virus, malware or hardware failure. 
Yin et al (2012) study the impacts of different backup policies on availability 
measures such as storage availability, system availability, and user-perceived avail-
ability. The author’s studies show the effectiveness of the combination of full back-
up and partial back-up in terms of user-perceived data availability and data loss rate. 
Sensitivity ranking can also help improve the availability measures. 
“The three categories that are used to classify in-formation security risks are 
confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility or availability of information (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2002).  
• A security breach in confidentiality is defined as sources not intended to 
have knowledge of the information have been provided with this knowledge. 
An example of this category would be sending sensitive data to the wrong per-
son.  
• A security breach in integrity is an incident where there is an unauthor-
ized or incorrect change made to an information source. An example of this cat-
egory is a financial accounting error causing the information in the database to 
be inaccurate.  
• A security breach in accessibility occurs when either access for those 
entitled to a system is denied or access is given to those who are not authorized 
to access the system. An example of this category would be an authorized user 
of a system who is unable to access a system due to forgetting their password.” 
Cited in (Carstens et al., 2004) 
6. Risk assessment and data protection audit 
An important internal audit function is evaluating the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of an organization’s control processes. These control processes include 
the policies, procedures and activities in place within an organization for man-
aging risk and achieving organizational objectives. 
In the standard, developed by the International Organization for Standardiza-
tion (ISO), “control processes” are defined as an organization’s management 
system. To conform to the ISO standard, organizations are required to establish 
and maintain management system processes. Organizations are also required to 
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establish internal audit programs. The guidelines for understanding these inter-
nal audit requirements are set out in ISO 19011, Guidelines for Auditing Man-
agement Systems (ISO 19011, 2011). 
ISO 19011:2011 provides guidance on auditing management systems, in-
cluding the principles of auditing, managing an audit programme and conduct-
ing management system audits, as well as guidance on the evaluation of compe-
tence of individuals involved in the audit process, including the person manag-
ing the audit programme, auditors and audit teams. The standard is applicable to 
all organizations that need to conduct internal or external audits of management 
systems or manage an audit programme. The application of the standard to other 
types of audits is possible, provided that special consideration is given to the 
specific competence needed. 
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